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COMMENTS
PROPOSED CLIENT PERJURY: A CRIMINAL DEFENSE
ATTORNEY'S ALTERNATIVES
Approval of the American Bar Association's revision of the rules
ofpro/essional conduct is imminent. Unfortunately, lawyers will
continue to grapple with the problem of criminal client perjury.
In this comment, the author critically examines the solutions
proposed by the American Bar Association and suggests alterna-
tive methods to aid the attorney in dealing with the diffcult is-
sues that may arise.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most difficult and controversial problems that a crimi-
nal defense attorney' may face in his practice is when he discovers or a
client informs him that he intends to commit perjury at trial.2 An attor-
ney so confronted must attempt to resolve the situation by weighing the
duty owed to the client as his advocate and advisor against the duty
owed to the court as one of its officers. If a criminal defendant admits
that he plans to lie on the witness stand, the attorney is caught between
two seemingly irreconcilable alternatives: exposing the perjury, and
possibly sacrificing his obligation to the client, or remaining silent, and
possibly sacrificing his duty owed to the court.
With this conflict as a backdrop, this comment examines the hazy
guidelines for attorney behavior relating to client perjury in criminal
cases established by the American Bar Association and illustrative case
law. In addition, it will analyze the myriad duties an attorney owes the
client and the court. Specifically, this comment addresses the failure of
established rules and regulations to reconcile these various duties and
to provide reasonable alternatives. Finally, various options available
to the criminal defense attorney suddenly made aware of his client's
potential perjury will be suggested and their consequences examined.
1. This comment will address a criminal defense attorney's alternatives in dealing
with client perjury. For a discussion of the prosecution's duty to prevent perjured
testimony, see McCloskey v. Boslow, 349 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1965); Smith v. War-
den, 254 F. Supp. 805 (D. Md. 1966). For a discussion of perjury problems in civil
cases, see Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 809, 827-32 (1977) [herein-
after cited as Wolfram].
2. Perjury is defined as:
the willful assertion as to a matter of fact, opinion, belief, or knowledge
made by a witness in a judicial proceeding as part of his evidence, either
upon oath or in any form allowed by law to be substituted for an oath,
whether such evidence is given in open court, or in an affidavit, or other-
wise, such assertion being material to the issue or point of inquiry and
known to such witness to be false.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1025 (5th ed. 1979).
II. BACKGROUND
A. Conflicting Duties and the Goals of the Judicial System
The conflict an attorney faces in dealing with client perjury be-
comes evident upon an examination of the attorney's various duties
owed to his client and the court. An attorney owes his client a duty to
protect confidential communications,3 to protect the client's right to tes-
tify,4 to represent the client zealously and effectively,5 and to protect
the client's right to a fair trial.6 It is an attorney's responsibility to per-
form these duties to the best of his ability, regardless of his client's guilt
or innocence.
On the other hand, as an officer of the court, an attorney is prohib-
ited from knowingly presenting false testimony' and is charged with
the affirmative duty of reporting his client's intended crimes.8 If a cli-
ent informs his attorney of his plan to lie on the witness stand, the
attorney is caught between maintaining his client's confidence and pro-
tecting his right to testify or revealing the plan to the court.
Consequently, an attorney confronted with such a situation must
resolve this dilemma by weighing the conflicting duties owed and de-
termining which entails the greater obligation. Underlying this conflict
are two seemingly opposite goals of the trial system: the truth seeking
function I and the adversary function. " Those who believe that this
balance should favor the search for truth suggest that perjured testi-
mony is the nemesis of justice; it may produce a judgment that is not
based on truth and defeats the primary objective of a trial." Support-
ers of the adversary function, however, believe that only through the
strongest maintenance of the adversary system will the truth be discov-
ered and a criminal defendant's individual rights be protected. 12
B. Professional Standards for the Defense Attorney
The professional and ethical standards which guide an attorney
represent an attempt to reconcile the two opposing functions of the
3. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1981) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as MODEL CODE].
4. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
5. MODEL CODE, supra note 3, Canons 6, 7.
6. See infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
7. MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 7-102(A)(4).
8. Id DR 4-101(C)(3).
9. See Frankel, The Search for Truth.: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031
(1975).
10. See Freedman, Judge Frankel's Searchfor Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060 (1975).
11. See In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1945) (citations omitted).
12. Professor Freedman explains that the protection of one's constitutional rights may
impede the search for the truth. An example is the fifth amendment's protection
against compulsory self-incrimination. Freedman suggests that it would be much
easier to expose a defendant's guilt if he had no right to remain silent. Freedman,
Judge Frankel's Searchfor Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060, 1063-64 (1975).
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judicial system. An attorney faced with a client's perjured testimony
will normally consult the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(Model Code) adopted in the particular state.' 3 Presently, the Ameri-
can Bar Association is in the process of revising the Model Code.' 4
The revised code, known as the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules), maintains a philosophy towards client perjury similar
to the Model Code. Criminal defense attorneys have also sought gui-
dance from the American Bar Association's Standards Relating to the
Defense Function (Defense Standards).' 5
1. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility
The Model Code, adopted by the American Bar Association in
1969, is the current standard for determining whether an attorney's
professional conduct is appropriate.' 6 While the Model Code, through
its three component parts, has identified the competing duties of the
attorney, 7 it fails to reconcile them. The Canons applicable to client
perjury, Canons 4 and 7, illustrate the Model Code's failure.
13. In Maryland, the MODEL CODE has been adopted and codified in MD. R. 1230
(1977 & Supp. 1982). The MODEL CODE has been adopted in various forms by
forty-nine states. Comment, The Failure of Situation-Oriented Professional Rules
to Guide Conduct- Conflicting Responsibilities of the Criminal Defense Attorney
Whose Client Commits or Intends to Commit Perjury, 55 WASH. L. REV. 211, 221
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
14. See infra note 16.
15. Presently, the defense function standard dealing with client perjury has been with-
drawn pending the revision of the MODEL CODE. See infra note 47.
16. The MODEL CODE was adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in 1969 and
became effective on January 1, 1970. MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at i. In 1977,
the ABA president appointed the Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards, headed by Robert J. Kutak, to reevaluate and revise the MODEL CODE.
In January 1980, a discussion draft of the new rules was released by the Kutak
Commission. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft
1980). Subsequently, in June 1982, the revised final draft of the rules was re-
leased. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Revised Final Draft 1982).
For an analysis of the effect of these new rules on client perjury, see infra notes 32-
38 and accompanying text.
The current MODEL CODE, which guides the attorney by providing ethical
standards for him to follow, MODEL CODE, supra note 3, preamble at 1, is made
up of three separate but interrelated parts: canons, ethical considerations, and
disciplinary rules. The nine canons are "statements of axiomatic norms, expres-
sing in general terms, the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in
their relationship with the public, the legal system, and with the legal profession."
MODEL CODE, supra note 3, preliminary statement at 2. The ethical considera-
tions are "inspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which
every member of the profession should strive." Id The disciplinary rules are
"mandatory in character . . . [and) state the minimum level of conduct below
which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action." Id
17. In addition to the duties owed to the client and the court, the MODEL CODE also
recognizes the lawyer's responsibility to his fellow attorneys, to the public, and to
himself. T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 4 (1981). A discussion of these additional responsibili-
ties, however, is beyond the scope of this comment.
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The attorney's duty to maintain the confidences' 8 and secrets 9 of
the client is established in Canon 4.2" That duty is not absolute, how-
ever, since a lawyer can reveal his client's criminal intent and the infor-
mation necessary to prevent the crime.2'
The New York Supreme Court is one of the few courts to construe
the sections of the Model Code pertaining to client perjury.22 In People
v. Salquerro 23 the defendant, charged with robbery and murder, "un-
equivocally" informed his attorney that he intended to lie when he tes-
tified in his own behalf.24 The attorney informed the trial judge and
assistant district attorney of the client's intended perjury without re-
vealing its nature or substance. The attorney, concerned that he lost
the client's confidence, moved both to withdraw from representation
and for recusal of the trial judge.
The New York Supreme Court, in an interlocutory decree, af-
firmed the denial of the defense motions because Canon 4 allows an
attorney to reveal the client's intention to commit perjury. The Sal-
querro court also alluded to Canon 7 and its corresponding disciplinary
rules in denying the motions.25
Canon 7 of the Model Code,2 6 in attempting to strike a balance
between the attorney's duty to the client and his duty as an officer of
the court, advises the attorney to represent his client zealously.27 How-
ever, an attorney who knowingly participates in the introduction of
fraudulent, false, or perjured testimony or evidence is subject to disci-
pline. 28 Based upon these pronouncements, the Salquerro court stated
that "there can never be a real conflict between the attorney's obliga-
tion to provide a zealous defense and his moral duties to himself and
18. Confidence includes information protected by the attorney-client privilege, that is
disclosed in the professional relationship. MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 4-
101(A).
19. Secret refers to information, other than that covered by the attorney-client privi-
lege, disclosed in the professional relationship. Id
20. "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client," MODEL
CODE, supra note 3, Canon 4.
21. Id DR 4-101(C)(3).
22. Because the MODEL CODE involves regulation of professional and ethical behav-
ior, it is rarely applied in cases involving a criminal defendant's perjury. More
often, the MODEL CODE is applied in attorney disciplinary proceedings, of which
there are few reported opinions.
23. 107 Misc. 2d 155, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
24. Id at 155, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 712. The court failed to indicate how the defendant
"unequivocally" informed his counsel that he intended to lie.
25. Id
26. "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law,"
MODEL CODE, supra note 3, Canon 7.
27. The ethical considerations supporting the zealous representation advocated by
Canon 7 suggest that the advocate can argue any permissible construction of the
law that favors his client, id EC 7-4, and as an advocate "should resolve in favor
of his client doubts as to the bounds of the law." Id EC 7-3.
28. Id EC 7-26. The attorney shall not "[k]nowingly use perjured testimony or false
evidence." Id DR 7-102(A)(4).
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the court."29 Nonetheless, the Model Code's provisions dealing with
client perjury have been criticized as being unclear and confusing3° and
as providing little or no guidance to an attorney seeking to fulfill his
various obligations. Basically, the Model Code fails to suggest any
course of action for an attorney faced with client perjury, other than
revealing it.
2. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The American Bar Association's Commission on Evaluation of
Professional Standards released its revised final draft of the Model
Rules in June, 1982.32 It was hoped that the Model Rules would finally
determine how a criminal defense attorney should react to intended
client pejury.
While attempting to accommodate the competing considerations
of the client perjury dilemma, the Model Rules fail to meet the chal-
lenge of providing the attorney with viable alternatives. Like the
Model Code, the rules forbid an attorney from knowingly presenting
evidence which the lawyer knows to be false.33 If the attorney subse-
quently discovers that evidence already presented is false, he must take
"reasonable remedial measures. 34 Yet the Model Rules fail where the
Model Code also failed - in providing reasonable, well thought out
options encompassing the remedial measures. The comments to the
rule suggest that disclosure is the only alternative if the attorney's ef-
forts to prevent perjury have failed.3 The rules state that the duty to
disclose continues even if compliance would require violating attorney-
client confidentiality. 36 But the rules fail to distinguish disclosure in
29. People v. Salquerro, 107 Misc. 2d 155, 156, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711, 712 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980).
30. Wolfram, Client Perjury: The Kutak Commission and the Association of Trial Law-
yers on Lawyers, Lying Clients, and the Adversary System, 1980 A.B. FOUND. RE-
SEARCH J. 964, 973.
31. M. FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 29 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as FREEDMAN]; accord Note, Professional Responsibility-Ethical Duties
of Counsel Who Believes Client's Witnesses Will Commit Perjury, 2 U. BALT. L.
REV. 326, 330 (1973) (there is no specific direction from the MODEL CODE for an
attorney who has a reasonable belief, but is not certain, that the client will commit
perjury).
32. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Revised Final Draft 1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as MODEL RULES]. The ABA House of Delegates began its consideration
of the MODEL RULES in August, 1982. Id at 3. Consideration of the MODEL
RULES continued at the midyear meeting of the Association in February, 1983.
The entire MODEL RULES will be approved or disapproved in August, 1983. Tele-
phone interview with Robin Alexander of the National Center for Professional
Responsibility (Mar. 2, 1983). The ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS dealing with cli-
ent perjury have been withdrawn pending the approval of the MODEL RULES.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
33. MODEL RULES, supra note 32, Rule 3.3(a)(4).
34. Id.
35. Id comment at 21.
36. Id Rule 3.3(b).
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jury and nonjury cases, and neglect to analyze the problems in each.
In a feeble effort to accommodate decisions like Lowery v. Card-
well,37 the comments to the Model Rules warn that considerations of a
defendant's constitutional right to assistance of counsel may supercede
the pronouncement of the Model Rules.38 Instead of providing an at-
torney with reasonable solutions which take into account his various
duties, the Model Rules simply add to the murkiness of the dilemma.
To be useful a solution must take into account all of the competing
ramifications - ethical, constitutional, and practical. Since the Model
Rules fail to do this their realistic applicability is limited.
3. The American Bar Association's Standards Relating to the
Defense Function
The Defense Standards39 are suggestive, nonmandatory "guide-
lines and recommendations intended to help criminal justice planners
design a system, set goals and priorities to achieve it, and propose pro-
cedures for adoption by the legislature, courts, and practitioners to op-
erate it and keep it viable."'  The Defense Standards are designed to
supplement the Model Code,4 and to provide guidelines of profes-
sional practice for lawyers to follow in criminal matters.42 These stan-
dards were originally approved in 1971 with certain revisions adopted
in 1979.43 Those revisions not approved dealt with client peIjury."
In the section dealing with attorney-client confidentiality, the re-
37. 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978). See infra notes 110-123 and accompanying text.
38. MODEL RULES, supra note 32, Rule 3.3 comment. The ABA House of Delegates,
at its February, 1983 meeting, refused to create an exception to protect a criminal
defendant's constitutional rights at trial. Baltimore Sun, Feb. 9, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
39. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION. (Approved Draft 1971) [herein-
after cited as DEFENSE STANDARDS].
The Advisory Committee on the Prosecution and Defense Function worked
on the standards from 1964 until 1971, and was chaired until 1969 by then Circuit
Judge Warren E. Burger of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.
The reports were circulated in tentative draft form in March, 1970. In March,
1971 the DEFENSE STANDARDS were approved with amendments by the ABA
House of Delegates. ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 481-82 (Compilation 1974).
In August, 1977, the Standing Committee on Association Standards for
Criminal Justice was elevated from a special to a permanent committee and was
authorized to update the DEFENSE STANDARDS. These updates were adopted,
with some revisions by the ABA House of Delegates at its Febraury, 1979 meet-
ing. Comment, supra note 13, at 226 n.82. The 18 volumes of the criminal justice
standards were revised in 1980. 1 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE XV-
xvi (2D ED. 1980) [HEREINAFTER CITED AS REVISED STANDARDS].
40. 1 REVISED STANDARDS, supra note 39, at xx.
41. Wolfram, supra note 1, at 824.
42. Sutton, How Vulnerable is the Code of Professional Responsibility, 57 N.C. L.
REV. 497, 504 (1979).
43. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
44. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
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vised standards attempt to balance the competing duties of the criminal
defense attorney. That section advises the attorney to explain to the
client the necessity of full disclosure and the obligation of confidential-
ity. 5 It allows an attorney to "reveal the expressed intention of a client
to commit a crime" if the crime might "seriously endanger the life or
safety of any person or corrupt the processes of the courts."46
Whether client perjury is included in the crimes referred to is un-
known, however, given that the status of Defense Standard section 7.7,
dealing with client perjury, is uncertain. 7 The American Bar Associa-
45. 1 REVISED STANDARDS, supra note 39, § 4-3.1, at 4.28.
46. Id § 4-3.7(d), at 4.48.
47. The new standard that was expected to be included in the 1980 REVISED STAN-
DARDS, as approved by the ABA Standing Committee on Association Standards
for Criminal Justice, was withdrawn prior to its submission to the ABA House of
Delegates. This section was tabled pending the final recommendations of the
ABA Special Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards (the Kutak
Commission). 1 REVISED STANDARDS, supra note 39, at 4.95 editor's note. For an
analysis of the Kutak Commission's report and its effect on client perjury, see
supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text. If the recommendations of the Kutak
Commission are approved by the ABA House of Delegates, the DEFENSE STAN-
DARD dealing with client perjury will be revised to conform to the MODEL RULES.
Telephone interview with Sarah Applegate of the Standing Committee on Associ-
ation Standards for Criminal Justice (Mar. 3, 1983).
The original and REVISED STANDARDS are similar except for some minor
language variations. The REVISED STANDARDS' language is presented here in
italicized parentheticals next to the language of the original standard.
7.7 Testimony by the defendant.
(a) If the defendant has admitted to his lawyer (to defense counsel) facts
which establish guilt and the lawyer's (counsel's) independent investiga-
tion establishes that the admissions are true but the defendant insists
on his (the) right to trial, the lawyer (counsel) must advise his client
(strongly discourage the defendant) against taking the witness stand to
testify falsely (perjuriously).
(b) If, before trial (in advance of trial), the defendant insists that he (he
or she) will take the stand to testify falsely (perjuriously), the lawyer
must (may) withdraw from the case, if that is feasible, seeking leave of
the court if necessary (seeking leave of the court if necessary, but the court
should not be advised of the lawyer's reason for seeking to do so).
(c) If withdrawal from the case is not feasible or is not permitted by the
court, or if the situation arises during the trial (immediately preceding
trial or during trial) and the defendant insists upon testifying falsely (per-
juriousy) in his (in his or her) own behalf, it is unprofessional conduct
for the lawyer to lend his aid (to lend aid) to the perjury or use the per-
jured testimony. Before the defendant takes the stand in these circum-
stances, the lawyer should make a record of the fact that the defendant is
taking the stand against the advice of counsel in some appropriate man-
ner without revealing the fact to the court. The lawyer must confine his
examination to identifying the witness as the defendant and permitting
him to make his statement to the trier or triers of facts; the lawyer may
not engage in direct examination of the defendant as a witness in the
conventional manner and may not later argue the defendant's known
false version of fact to the jury as worthy of belief and he may not recite
or rely upon the false testimony in his closing argument. (The lawyer
may identify the witness as the defendant and may ask appropriate ques-
tions of the defendant when it is believed that the defendant's answers will
tion has delayed the implementation of this revised section pending the
final recommendations of the committee revising the Model Code.48
Since the revision of the Model Code is not expected to be approved
until August, 198349 there is no Defense Standard dealing with client
perjury presently in effect. However, it is useful to examine the original
section 7.7's advantages and disadvantages because there is little sub-
stantive change in the revised section.
Section 7.7 attempts to reach a balance of the attorney's competing
interests within the restrictions of the Model Code. According to sec-
tion 7.7, when a client intends to commit perjury the attorney must
advise the client against such conduct.5" If the client insists otherwise,
the attorney must withdraw when possible.5 Finally, the attorney
should indicate his disapproval of the client's actions without revealing
such protests to the fact-finder and allow the defendant to make a nar-
rative statement when he takes the stand.52 The statement may not be
argued to the jury or used in closing argument.53 This method is predi-
cated on the defendant admitting inculpatory facts to the attorney
which have been corroborated by the attorney's own investigation.54
Because the defendant's right to testify is protected by section 7.7,
that section seems to stress the attorney's obligation to protect his cli-
ent's right over the attorney's other duties. The standard implies that
the defendant's right to testify is utmost and, consequently, it is the
fact-finder's job to determine whether that testimony is true or false.
In its first case dealing with client perjury, the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals implicitly approved the use of section 7.7. In
Thornton v. United States,55 the defendant claimed that ineffective
assistance of counsel led to his conviction for various crimes associated
with the robbery of a restaurant and lounge. At his first meeting with
his appointed counsel, the defendant asserted that he was at the lounge
not be perjurious. As to mattersfor which it is believed the defendant will
offer perjurious testimony, the lawyer should seek to avoid direct examina-
tion of the defendant in the conventional manner, instead, the lawyer should
ask the defendant if he or she wishes to make any additional statement
concerning the case to the trier or triers of thefacts. A lawyer may not
later argue the defendant's known false version of thefacts to the jury as
worthy of belief, and may not recite or rely upon the false testimony in his
or her closing argument.)
1 REVISED STANDARDS, supra note 39, at 4-77 (reprinted with permission of Lit-
tle, Brown and Co.); DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 39, § 7.7.
48. See I REVISED STANDARDS, supra note 39, at 4.95 editor's note.
49. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
50. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 39, § 7.7(a).
51. Id § 7.7(b). For a discussion of this alternative, see infra notes 135-45 and ac-
companying text.
52. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 39, § 7.7(c).
3. Id.
54. Id at 276. For a further discussion of the problems involved in determining when
an attorney should know of his client's intended perjury, see infra note 133.
55. 357 A.2d 429 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976).
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to retrieve money he had paid for a stereo. However, at a meeting with
counsel several days before trial the defendant was faced with the gov-
ernment's evidence of his arrest near the scene of the crime wearing
bloodstained pants and his identification by one of the victims. At the
meeting the defendant denied being at the scene and offered an alibi.56
Defense counsel moved to withdraw because he did not want to present
what he thought was false testimony and also to have the case certified
to another judge.
The judge did not rule on the attorney's motion to withdraw, but
did certify the case to another judge. The second judge, after refusing
the attorney's renewed motion to withdraw, allowed the attorney to fol-
low the recommendations of section 7.7.57 In affirming the defendant's
conviction the appeals court approved the use of section 7.7 sub silen-
tio, holding that the defendant was not deprived of effective assistance
of counsel. 8 The court determined that although counsel did not ques-
tion the defendant directly at trial about his perjurious defense, he
thoroughly interrogated other witnesses and uncovered weaknesses in
the prosecution's case.59
In Thornton, the defendant's attorney was faced with an obvious
situation: his client completely altered his defense midway through the
preparation of the case. Because of this, the court allowed the attorney
to resort to section 7.7.60 Unfortunately, the standard fails to define the
point at which an attorney can resort to its suggestions since it is not
always as apparent when a client will lie as it was in Thornton.
In Butler v. United States,6 the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals, citing Thornton, held that defense counsel could follow the sec-
tion 7.7 guidelines "when in possession of substantial facts indicating
that his client is going to give perjured testimony before a jury."6 2 The
Butler court believed, however, that the inconsistent representations
56. The opinion does not indicate the substance of the new alibi. 357 A.2d at 432.
57. Id at 432-33.
58. Id at 437. The court hesitated in affirmatively adopting section 7.7, stating that:
[w]hile ABA Standard § 7.7 was adopted after intensive consideration of
the problems presented by a defendant's determination to testify in a
way in which defense counsel knows to be false, and its content is emi-
nently sound, we do not feel that it is part of our role to adopt or for-
mally sanction any of the standards. We firmly believe, however, that
collectively they have made an extraordinary contribution to the crimi-
nal justice process.
Id at 437 n. 14.
59. Id at 438.
60. The Thornton court held that use of section 7.7 was feasible when "it [was] clear
from defense counsel's colloquy with the first trial judge that counsel felt, based
on his trial preparation, that the eleventh-hour change in the appellant's story
would result in his client's testifying falsely." Id
61. 414 A.2d 844 (D.C. 1980).
62. Id at 850. In Butler, trial was before a judge. Id. Defense counsel told a motions
judge, who later became the trier of fact, that his client intended to commit per-
jury. Id at 848.
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made by the defendant about possession of a gun were insufficient to
indicate to the attorney that his client was going to commit perjury. 63
The court failed to explain why Thornton's inconsistent statements
triggered the use of section 7.7, while Butler's did not.
Through the explicit and implicit approval of section 7.7, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals recognizes an overriding interest in
protecting the defendant's right to testify. That recognition places the
burden of determining when a defendant is lying on the judge or jury.
Accordingly, the attorney is expected to aid in protecting the defend-
ant's right to testify. As Thornton indicates, use of the defense standard
does not necessarily insulate a defendant from conviction.
Today, the status of revised section 7.7 is questionable because it
has been withdrawn pending the revision of the Model Code.' Al-
though the standard does have certain practical disadvantages, 65 it rep-
resents the best attempt yet to deal with the client perjury problem. An
examination of the attorney's common law duties owed to his client
and the court, and a comparison of those duties with the various alter-
natives available upon learning of a client's perjury indicates that De-
fense Standard section 7.7 best accomodates many of those duties.
III. THE ATTORNEY'S COMMON LAW DUTIES
The approach of both the Model Code and the Defense Standards
with regard to client perjury represents a statutory attempt to reconcile
the attorney's duties to his client with his duties to the court. Providing
practical options to reach this balance, however, may result in a wither-
ing of the attorney-client relationship and certain individual rights. An
examination of the attorney's common law duties must be made in
order to determine which of his alternative courses of action, upon
learning of his client's intent to commit perjury, best accomodates those
duties.
A. Protecting Confidential Communications
In responding to intended client perjury, an attorney should con-
sider both the ethical" and evidentiary67 aspects of protecting confi-
63. Id
64. 1 REVISED STANDARDS, supra note 39, at 4.95 editor's note.
65. Use of a narrative statement has been criticized because it may allow objectiona-
ble testimony into trial. Conversely, the reasons for use of the narrative statement
may be explained to the fact-finder. See infra notes 151-59 and accompanying
text.
66. The ethical obligation not to disclose client confidences arises out of the trust a
client places in his attorney. Bar Ass'n v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 519, 307 A.2d
677, 682 (1973). The obligation exists in order to allow free and extensive com-
munication between attorney and client, Wolfram, supra note 1, at 838, and con-
sequently better representation. United States ex rel Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d
115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977).
67. The evidentiary aspects are embodied in the attorney-client privilege, which pro-
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dential communications. According to one court, "[tihe protection of a
client's confidence is so basic a tenet of professional responsibility that
it yields only the rarest of ethical dilemmas. '"68
But an exception to both the ethical obligation69 and the eviden-
tiary rule7" does exist. The Model Code permits, but does not mandate,
revealing a client's intention to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent it.7 The future crime exception to the evidentiary
rule allows disclosure of a client's communications when he either
seeks legal advice on a criminal plan or announces his intent to commit
a crime.72 Thus, an attorney faced with possible client perjury is not
bound to disclose that possibility, but may do so without breaching his
professional duty.
tects information passed between the attorney and client in a professional rela-
tionship from being disclosed. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2290-
92 (McNaughton ed. 1961). In describing the privilege, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland has stated:
The privilege is an accomodation of competing public interests, the as-
cendancy for compelling policy reasons of the protection from unau-
thorized disclosure of communications between an attorney and his
client over the general testimonial duty and compulsion in the interest of
truth and justice. The attorney-client privilege is basic to a relation of
trust and confidence that, though not given express constitutional secur-
ity, is nonetheless essentially interrelated with the specific constitutional
guarantees of the individual's right to counsel and immunity from self-
incrimination ....
Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 133, 345 A.2d 830, 837 (1975). The attorney-client
privilege has been codified in Maryland. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-
108 (1980).
68. Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844, 849 (D.C. 1980).
69. MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 4-101(C)(3).
70. See generally Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (the privilege protect-
ing communications between attorney and client is destroyed if the client attempts
to perpetrate a fraud on the court); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2298 (McNaugh-
ton ed. 1961); Comment, supra note 13, at 220.
71. MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 4-101(C)(3).
72. In a renowned statement discussing the privilege, Justice Cardozo stated:
There is a privilege protecting communications between attorney and
client. The privilege takes flight if the relation is abused. A client who
consults an attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of
a fraud will have no help from the law. He must let the truth be told.
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933). In a Second Circuit opinion, Judge
Clark in United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 589
(1939), determined that the attorney for the defendant could testify against the
defendant in a trial for mail fraud in the sale of stock in a gold mine. The attor-
ney's testimony related to conversations and communications with the defendant
concerning his control of the mining companies. Since the communications oc-
curred during the commission, and in furtherance, of the crime charged in the
indictment, they were not privileged. 106 F.2d at 40. The court noted that a prima
facie showing of the crime must be made before an attorney may testify regarding
communications from a client; the simple assertion of a crime or fraud is not
enough. Id.
The future crimes exception has also been applied in a criminal case when a
defendant intended to present false witnesses. State v. Phelps, 24 Or. App. 329,
334-35, 545 P.2d 901, 904-05 (1976).
While the attorney may disclose communications involving future
crimes, he cannot reveal his client's confessions to past crimes.7 3 One
commentator has noted that by disclosing his client's intention to com-
mit perjury, the attorney is in effect telling the court that the client has
committed the crime.74 That is, the judge will probably ask the attor-
ney how his knowledge of the truth differs from what the client intends
to say. If the client has confessed his guilt to the attorney, he will claim
that the attorney-client privilege prevents him from answering. The
judge will most likely assume that the client has confessed his guilt, and
as a result the duty to keep past crimes confidential is breached.
The difficulty of maintaining attorney-client confidentiality in situ-
ations involving client perjury is illustrated in Johnson v. United
States .7 There the District of Columbia Court of Appeals determined
that an attempt by the trial judge to fully inquire into the defendant's
alleged perjury would interfere with the attorney-client privilege.76
Johnson was charged with petit larceny after the government's evi-
dence showed that he attempted to leave a supermarket with several
hams placed in a trash can. When the hams were discovered, Johnson
claimed that he did not know where the hams came from. At trial, in
response to the trial court's request for a proffer of defense, Johnson's
attorney explained that the defendant, a cab driver, had driven a pas-
senger to the store and had purchased the trash can for her not know-
ing its contents. At first the defendant did not testify, but later in the
trial Johnson's attorney announced that his client would take the stand.
Responding again to the court's request, defense counsel stated that
Johnson would testify that he never attempted to leave the store. Due
to the discrepancy between the proffered defenses, the trial court an-
nounced that the attorney would not be able to question the defendant
or argue his testimony to the jury. Finally, the defendant decided not to
testify and the jury returned a guilty verdict.
Finding that the trial court impermissibly interjected itself into the
case, the appellate court reversed and remanded. The court stated that
it was up to the defense attorney to determine when his client would
commit perjury, and that it was not within the discretion of the trial
judge to "touch upon privileged attorney-client communications. 77
According to the court, the trial court's finding that the second proffer
was false because of the inconsistencies between the defendant's stories
was based on surmise.78 The court distinguished its previous holding
73. See generaly Lefstein, The Criminal Defendant Who Proposes Perjury: Rethinking
the Defense Lawyer's Dilemma, 6 HOFSTRA L. Rv. 665, 683-87 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Lefstein].
74. Lefstein, supra note 73, at 684-85.
75. 404 A.2d 162 (D.C. 1979).





in Thornton v. United States79 because the attorney knew the defend-
ant's testimony was false due to his investigations and conversations
with the client.8 0
While Johnson recognizes the importance of protecting attorney-
client communications even in cases involving client perjury, like
Thornton, it fails to establish a reliable and consistent standard by
which the attorney can act in response to client perjury. Because this
standard has not been developed, attorneys may find themselves un-
knowingly breaching their confidential relationship with clients.
B. Protecting the Client's Right to Testify
If a trial court or an attorney keeps a defendant from testifying in
order to prevent perjury, an issue arises as to whether the defendant's
right to testify has been violated. However, whether the opportunity to
testify in one's own behalf is a right is unclear. In Maryland, an ac-
cused has the right to testify in his own behalf at trial."s At the federal
level it is unclear whether a defendant has a right or merely a privilege
to testify. 2 While there may be no right or privilege to testify falsely,83
one case involving client perjury illustrates the difficulty of balancing
the defendant's right to testify with the attorney's duty to the court.
79. 357 A.2d 429 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976).
80. Johnson v. United States, 404 A.2d 162, 164 (D.C. 1979).
81. English v. State, 16 Md. App. 439, 445, 298 A.2d 464, 468 (1973). The statute in
effect in 1973, MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 4 (1972), provided: "In the trial of all
indictments,. . . against persons charged with the commission of crimes and of-
fenses, . . . the person shall at his own request, be deemed a competent witness."
Id This section was repealed and replaced by MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. §§ 9-101, 9-107 (1980 & Supp. 1982). Section 9-101 states that "a person
shall not be excluded from testifying in a proceeding because of incapacity from
crime .... ." Id § 9-101. Section 9-107 states that "[a] person may not be com-
pelled to testify in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination. The failure
of a defendant to testify in a criminal proceeding on this basis does not create any
presumption against him." Id § 9-107.
82. Compare Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913, 920-23 (1982) (defendant has a right to
testify) and Poe v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 173, 176 (D.D.C.) (defendant has a
right to testify on his own behalf and it is the obligation of the courts to inform
him of his right), afl'd, 352 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1965) with United States v.
Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 943-44 (2d Cir. 1963) (the defendant has a privilege to
testify on his own behalf). See generally Lefstein, supra note 73, at 683.
It is equally unclear from where the right or privilege emanates. See, e.g.,
United States v. Looper, 419 F.2d 1405, 1406 (4th Cir. 1969) (whether the right is
constitutional or statutory, it may not be denied if a defendant decides to exercise
it); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1976) ("In trial of all persons charged with the commis-
sion of offenses against the United States. . . the person charged shall, at his own
request, be a competent witness.").
83. In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the United States Supreme Court,
holding that a defendant's credibility would be impeached with statements ob-
tained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), commented that
the defendant's privilege to testify "cannot be construed to include the right to
commit perjury." Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (citations omit-
ted); accord Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844, 859 (D.C. 1980) (Reilly, C.J.,
dissenting).
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In United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 84 an attorney thought
his client would present a perjured alibi defense and cooperated with
the trial judge to prevent the defendant from testifying. The defendant,
Norman Wilcox, was initially tried85 and convicted of rape in the
County Court of Philadelphia in 1967.6 Wilcox attempted to establish
an alibi defense of noninvolvement through his own testimony and that
of two relatives. Due to a procedural error, however, the case was re-
tried.8 7 At the retrial, Wilcox's newly appointed public defender de-
cided to abandon the alibi theory, and thus the need for Wilcox's
testimony, and instead used a consent defense.8 8 The state trial judge
subsequently ruled that if Wilcox insisted on testifying his attorney
would be permitted to withdraw and Wilcox would have to represent
himself during the remainder of the trial.89 As a result, Wilcox decided
not to testify, the consent defense was used, and Wilcox was again
convicted.
Wilcox's second petition for a writ of habeas corpus was granted
and the state appealed to the Third Circuit. After a thorough discus-
sion of the right to testify, the court concluded that federal tribunals
recognize a criminal defendant's constitutional right to testify in his
own behalf.90 But instead of grounding its decision on this theory the
court found that the trial judge's ruling, permitting Wilcox's appointed
counsel to withdraw if the defendant testified, constituted an impermis-
sible infringement on his state right to testify91 and his sixth amend-
ment right to effective counsel. As a result, the defendant was deprived
of his right to a fair trial.92
In dictum, the court commented that Wilcox's attorney may have
erroneously concluded that the defendant's alibi defense was perjured.
In examining the perjury dilemma, the court stated that:
[i]f an attorney faced with this situation were in fact to discuss
with the Trial Judge his belief that his client intended to per-
jure himself, without possessing a firm factual basis for that
84. 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977).
85. The state proceeding was a nonjury trial. Id. at 116.
86. Id
87. Because a verdict of guilty had been announced without a closing argument by
Wilcox's counsel, the district court granted the defendant's writ of habeas corpus,
which was stayed in order to allow the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to retry
the defendant. Id
88. Wilcox was not made aware of the switch until after the close of the state's case
and he objected to it. Id at 116-17.
89. The appeals court surmised that Wilcox's attorney probably explained to the
judge that the alibi defense would have been perjured and if used the attorney
would make a motion to withdraw. This determination was made by a federal
district court judge at a subsequent habeas corpus evidentiary hearing. Id at 121-
22.
90. Id at 119.
91. The court determined that "Wilcox definitely had a statutory right to testify under
Pennsylvania law." Id at 120.
92. Id at 121.
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belief, he would be violating the duty imposed on him as a
defense counsel. While defense counsel in a criminal case as-
sumes a dual role as a "zealous advocate" and as an "officer
of the court," neither role would countenance disclosure to
the Court of counsel's private conjectures about the guilt or
innocence of his client. it is the role of the judge or the jury to
determine the facts, not that of the attorney.9
Wilcox is one of the more sensitive decisions in the client perjury
area because it recognizes the defense attorney's opposing duties and
the impact of the dilemma on the criminal defendant's rights. The de-
cision implies that a defendant's right to testify is so important that an
attorney or judge who believes that the defendant will lie cannot pre-
vent him from testifying. Yet it, like other criminal perjury decisions,
fails to establish a standard by which an attorney can gauge when and
how to react to intended client perjury.
C Representing the Defendant Zealously and Effectively
As Wilcox indicates there is a concomitant professional94 and
common law duty to represent the client zealously even when con-
fronted with possible client perjury.9 5 Not only is a defendant entitled
to zealous representation, he is also entitled to effective representation
which may reach constitutional proportions.96 If the client intends to
commit perjury the attorney may be sacrificing these two duties by de-
ciding to withdraw, by preventing the defendant from testifying, or by
offering the client's perjurious intent to the court.97
93. Id. at 122.
94. "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law."
MODEL CODE, supra note 3, Canon 7.
95. Wilcox, 555 F.2d at 122.
96. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (in capital cases, effective aid in prepa-
ration and trial of case is mandated); see also Comment, supra note 13, at 229.
97. But see Wolfram, supra note 1, at 841 (refusal to represent perjurious defendant
should not be breach of duty); accord ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Informal Op. 1314 (1975).
In Maryland, the duty to provide zealous and effective representation may be
sacrificed without subjecting the attorney to charges of ineffective assistance of
counsel. A Maryland attorney owes his client competent assistance. See State v.
Mahoney, 16 Md. App. 193, 201, 294 A.2d 471, 475 (1972). The test to be applied
for determining whether trial counsel is competent is whether under all the cir-
cumstances of a particular case, counsel was so incompetent that the accused was
not afforded genuine and effective legal representation. Id ; see also State v. Ren-
shaw, 276 Md. 259, 264, 347 A.2d 219, 224 (1975). But an attorney's error in trial
tactics does not deprive his client of adequate representation. Caviness v. State,
244 Md. 575, 578, 224 A.2d 417, 418 (1966); State v. Merchant, 10 Md. App. 545,
551, 271 A.2d 752, 755 (1970). Consequently, an attorney might defend his deci-
sion not to call a lying client to the stand for strategic reasons. For example,
allowing the defendant to testify may expose him to detrimental cross-
examination.
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However, in a recent decision, State v. Lloyd, 9 the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals of Maryland held that failure to call alibi witnesses whom
the attorney thinks will lie is not ineffective assistance of counsel. 99 Al-
though there are many conflicting rights and responsibilities in deter-
mining whether a lying client should be allowed to testify, and Lloyd
involved lying witnesses as opposed to lying clients, the decision indi-
cates that failure to call a lying client to the stand may be acceptable for
strategic reasons. Therefore, it is arguable that in Maryland, when a
lying client is not called to testify for strategic reasons, there is no
ground for an attack due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
It is unlikely, however, that an attorney will be faced with a client
who admits his intent to lie. Rather, a defendant will present an im-
probable defense. Although an attorney's responsibility includes con-
ducting a proper factual and legal investigation 10 using the utmost
good faith, 1 failure to raise an available defense at trial is not, by
itself, a breach of the attorney's duty. 0 2 But when representation of a
defendant requires investigation of a certain defense, failure to do so
may amount to ineffectiveness. 0 3 Therefore, depending on the crime
with which the defendant is charged, an attorney may have an obliga-
tion to investigate a defense and then use that defense at trial, despite
the implausibility of the theory.1°4
D. Protecting the Right to a Fair Trial
While the obligation to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial
lies with both the attorney and the court, the attorney undertakes a
special responsibility because he represents, to many criminal defend-
98. 48 Md. App. 535, 429 A.2d 244 (1981). The issue of client perjury has not been
directly addressed in Maryland. Id at 546, 429 A.2d at 248.
99. id ; accord Cornell v. State, 396 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1975); State v. Mahoney,
16 Md. App. 193, 201, 294 A.2d 471, 475 (1972).
100. See, e.g., Bowler v. Warden, 236 F. Supp. 400, 404 (D. Md. 1964).
101. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm. v. Pollack, 279 Md. 225, 238, 369 A.2d 61,
68 (1977).
102. State v. Merchant, 10 Md. App. 545, 551, 271 A.2d 752, 755 (1970).
103. For example, in a rape case, investigation of the prosecutrix's reputation is consid-
ered an integral part of proper representation. In State v. Merchant, 10 Md. App.
545, 271 A.2d 752 (1970), the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that
failure to investigate the victim's reputation, when the defendant insisted she had
consented and the facts indicated consent was possible, amounted to ineffective-
ness of counsel. Although not a client perjury case, one of the attorneys in
Merchant indicated that he did not believe the defendant's consent theory. Id at
553, 271 A.2d at 756. According to the court the failure to investigate this theory,
simply because it was not believed, could not be considered a trial tactic. Id at
563, 271 A.2d at 761.
104. In the District of Columbia, in a jury trial where counsel has determined his client
will lie according to the criteria of DEFENSE STANDARD section 7.7 (the defendant
admits inculpatory facts which can be corroborated by the lawyer's own investiga-
tion) the attorney can follow the DEFENSE STANDARD'S suggestions and will not
be subject to a subsequent charge of ineffectiveness. Butler v. United States, 414
A.2d 844, 850 (D.C. 1980).
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ants, the only protection from what may be a confusing and harsh sys-
tem. Just because a defendant is brought to trial does not mean he is
guilty, and just because he is lying does not mean he is attempting to
escape a valid conviction. 0 5
The fifth,"° sixth,'07 and fourteenth 0 8 amendments insure the de-
fendant a fair and impartial trial. These provisions implicitly guaran-
tee that the events at trial should not prejudice the defendant in the
eyes of the fact-finder. 9 The most important case involving client per-
jury in relation to due process rights is Lowery v. Cardwell, 110 a Ninth
Circuit decision reversing a denial of a writ of habeas corpus.I" At
105. For example, Professor Monroe Freedman presents the situation of a defendant
who is falsely accused of a robbery at a particular location. FREEDMAN, supra
note 31, at 31. The defendant reveals to the attorney that he was in the vicinity of
the crime at the time of the incident, but was walking away. Of the two prosecu-
tion witnesses, one incorrectly identifies the defendant as the perpetrator. The
other witness testifies truthfully and accurately that she saw the defendant five
minutes before the crime, near the scene, thus corroborating the erroneous testi-
mony of the first witness. On cross examination, the reliability of the second wit-
ness is questioned by demonstrating that she is easily confused and has poor
eyesight. This casts doubt in the jurors' minds about the prosecution's case. Sub-
sequently, the defendant insists on testifying to deny the erroneous evidence of the
first witness and also to deny the truthful, but highly damaging, evidence of the
second. According to Freedman, "if [the defendant] tells the truth and verifies the
corroborating witness, the jury will be more inclined to accept the inaccurate testi-
mony of the principal witness, who specifically identified him as the criminal."
Id Professor Freedman would advise the defendant that such testimony is un-
lawful, but would present it to the jury in order to uphold the assurances of confi-
dentiality used to persuade the defendant to reveal all. Id Through this
hypothetical, Freedman suggests that although there are mechanisms within thejudicial system that protect an innocent defendant, sometimes these mechanisms
fail.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See, e.g., United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (fifth
amendment due process requires protection of fundamental concepts of justice
and community's sense of fair play and decency), reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 881
(1978).
107. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See, e.g., Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454,462 (1967)(impartial jury means that conclusions reached in a case will come only from
evidence and argument in open court, and not from any outside influence).
108. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See, e.g., Burnett v. State, 11 Md. App. 550, 554, 275
A.2d 176, 178-79 (1977) (the fourteenth amendment mandates that an individual
accused of a crime receive a fair and impartial trial).
109. See Lane v. Warden, 320 F.2d 179, 185 (4th Cir. 1963) (the jury should have no
fixed opinion as to the defendant's guilt or innocence, and the verdict should be
based solely on the facts submitted to them). A determination of prejudice to-
wards the defendant at trial is vested in the trial judge. See, e.g., Wilhelm v.
State, 272 Md. 404, 429, 326 A.2d 707, 723 (1964); Terrell v. State, 34 Md. App.
418, 429-30, 367 A.2d 95, 102 (1977); Davis v. State, 4 Md. App. 492, 497-98, 243
A.2d 616, 619 (1968). The judge's decision will not usually be disturbed absent an
abuse of discretion. Terrell v. State, 34 Md. App. 418, 429-30, 367 A.2d 95, 102
(1977).
110. 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978).
111. This was the second appeal of a denial of the writ. The first, Lowery v. Cardwell,
535 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1976), used here to supplement the factual analysis, vacated
the district court's denial of the writ and remanded the case.
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trial 12 for first degree murder the defendant, Jacqueline Lowery,
pleaded not guilty. During the trial, the state's principal witness indi-
cated he had seen Lowery walk to the deceased's car as the victim ap-
proached and that he then heard popping noises. Lowery, the only
defense witness, denied walking out with the deceased to his car and
firing the fatal shot. Immediately after the defendant's testimony the
defense counsel asked for and received a recess. In the judge's cham-
bers, outside the defendant's presence, Lowery's attorney moved to
withdraw but refused to give a reason. The motion was denied. No
further questions were asked of the defendant, and her attorney did not
refer to her testimony in closing argument. Lowery was found guilty
and the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed her conviction.' "
3
Upon appeal of the denial of the first writ of habeas corpus, the
Ninth Circuit remanded in part to discover why the attorney made the
motion to withdraw. After determining that the motion was made be-
cause the attorney thought Lowery was lying, the district court again
denied the defendant's writ and another appeal was taken. The Ninth
Circuit finally determined that the attorney's motion to withdraw,
made in the midst of Lowery's denial of participation in the crime and
before the judge trying the case, deprived the defendant of a fair
trial. " 4 The court concluded that the attorney's actions prevented the
fact-finder from making an impartial judgment and placed himself in
opposition to his client's position." 5 Contrasting the attorney's motion
to withdraw with his passive refusal to lend aid to his client (as pro-
vided for in Defense Standard section 7.7), the court suggested that
while following section 7.7 might notify a perceptive fact-finder of the
ethical problem faced by the attorney it would not amount to a viola-
tion of due process.
Lowery is unique in that it recognizes a due process violation when
an attorney's motion to withdraw notifies the fact-finder of a defend-
ant's possible perjury. But the decision's weaknesses serve only to
thicken the client perjury morass. The Ninth Circuit, in Lowery, re-
fused to establish a standard by which an attorney can ascertain if a
client will testify falsely. "16 Moreover, Lowery's peculiar circumstances
may limit it to its facts - the evidence against the defendant was tenu-
ous at best. 1 7 Also, the motion to withdraw was made in front of the
112. There was no jury in the state trial. Id at 547.
113. State v. Lowery, 111 Ariz. 26, 523 P.2d 54 (1974).
114. Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978).
115. Id at 730.
116. Id at 731 n.6.
117. In the first habeas corpus appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted the weaknesses of the
state's case:
[The principal witnesses' testimony] amounts to nothing more than that
he saw the appellant go with [the] decedent to the vehicle in which [the]
decedent's body was found some time later and that hearing noises that
sounded like firecrackers, he saw appellant walk away from the vehicle
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judge, who was the trier of fact, immediately after the defendant denied
being present at the scene of the crime. The lawyer's actions, according
to the court, signaled that he disagreed with the defendant's denial and
believed that the defendant had committed the crime.
A subsequent Ninth Circuit decision illustrates Lowery's limited
applicability. In United States v. Campbell, 8 the defendant was in-
dicted for armed bank robbery. After the defendant insisted on testify-
ing his attorney announced to the court, in front of the jury, that
Campbell was testifying against his advice. Attempting to adhere to
Defense Standard section 7.7, the attorney refrained from arguing the
defendant's testimony to the jury, who found the defendant guilty." 19
Affirming the lower court, the Ninth Circuit determined that al-
though defense counsel waivered from the American Bar Association
Defense Standard by informing the court and jury of his dispute with
the defendant, there was no deprivation of the defendant's right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel or to a fair trial.' 20 The court found that
the attorney's actions were not prejudicial to Campbell, especially since
the evidence was overwhelmingly against him.' 2 1 In contrast to Low-
ery, the court held that Campbell's attorney did not deprive him of a
fair trial because the lawyer's behavior did not amount to telling the
trier of fact that his client was lying. Additionally, the Campbell court
noted that a jury, not alert to the attorney's ethical problems, 22 might
think that the attorney wanted to prevent impeachment or damaging
cross-examination of the defendant. Because the Lowery court deter-
mined that a jury might interpret a lawyer's passive refusal to lend aid
as evidence of perjury, 23 Campbell's hypothesis is weak. A jury that
sees and hears a defense attorney abandon his client is likely to believe
the defendant is lying.
E. Protecting the Interests of the Court
If an attorney only owed a responsibility to his client, there would
be no perjury dilemma. But an attorney faced with possible client per-
jury must also remember that he owes a duty to the court to seek the
truth and maintain judicial integrity. A lawyer must constantly be
with what appeared to be a small gun in her hand [but which may have
been a purse].
535 F.2d at 547.
118. 616 F.2d 1151 (9th Cir. 1980).
119. Id at 1152.
120. Id
121. "[Dluring cross-examination Campbell admitted that he: (1) had previously been
convicted of robbery; (2) was previously acquainted with his co-defendant; and
(3) was in a motel room in which marked bills from the robbery were recovered."
Id at 1153. In addition five witnesses identified Campbell as one of the partici-
pants. Id at 1152.
122. But see FREEDMAN, supra note 31, at 37 (author suggests that the use of section
7.7 would alert a perceptive jury to the attorney's ethical problems).
123. Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1978).
[Vol. 12266
aware of the fact that he is an "officer of the court sworn to aid in the
administration of justice."'' 2 4
The problem with most of the rules developed by the legal estab-
lishment is that they fail to provide an attorney faced with client per-
jury any viable alternatives in meeting his duty to the court. 25 The
Model Code's ethical considerations 26 and disciplinary rules 127 are ve-
hement in their position but they do not provide a means for recon-
ciling the opposing duties.
1 28
Some state courts are very rigorous in their support of the attor-
ney's obligation to the court. In State v. Henderson, 129 a defendant in-
sisted on a defense that his attorney believed was totally false. The
court determined that the attorney, by disclosing to the court the an-
nounced intention of the client to commit perjury and moving to with-
draw, did not deny the defendant his right to full and fair
representation. The Kansas Supreme Court oversimplified the situa-
tion by viewing it as a matter of honesty with the court versus tendering
false evidence. 30 Factually it is important to note that Henderson had
made his attorney aware of an "avowed intention of presenting per-
jured testimony."'' Additionally, the attorney's motion to withdraw
was made prior to the impaneling of the jury, thus preventing any
prejudice. 32
In cases such as Henderson, where a fact-finder is unaware of the
dispute between attorney and client and the defendant's right to a fair
trial is not jeopardized, the attorney's motion to withdraw can be de-
nied and the trial can continue. But in situations similar to Lowery,
where the fact-finder may become aware of the defendant's perjury, no
guidelines are provided for the attorney other than the Model Code's
command against using perjured testimony. If this command is to be
met, practical options must be provided.
124. Baker v. Otto, 180 Md. 53, 55, 22 A.2d 924, 926 (1941).
125. The only rules which attempt to provide an alternative are the now outdated DE-
FENSE STANDARDS. See supra note 47.
126. MODEL CODE, supra note 3, EC 7-26.
127. Id DR 7-102(A)(4).
128. While the American Bar Association's DEFENSE STANDARD section 7.7 is an at-
tempt to provide a practical solution to the problem, its use is questionable due to
its uncertain status. See supra note 47. When the standard was in force, it was
praised as allowing the attorney to fulfill his obligations to the court. Thornton v.
United States, 357 A.2d 429, 438 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976). How-
ever, use of the standard has also been criticized as sacrificing the lawyer's duty to
the court. Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844, 857 (D.C. 1980) (Reilly, C.J.,
dissenting). Critics felt that disclosing the perjury was a better accommodation of
that duty embodied in the MODEL CODE.
129. 205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d 136 (1970).
130. Id at 236, 468 P.2d at 140.
131. Id at 237, 468 P.2d at 141.
132. Id. at 234, 468 P.2d at 139-40. At trial, the defendant, for an unknown reason,
refused to testify, enabling his attorney to proceed with his original defense with-
out referring to his client's story.
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IV. THE ATTORNEY'S OPTIONS
The attorney faced with a client who may commit perjury 13 3 can
examine four options developed from case law and professional stan-
dards: (1) motioning to withdraw from representation; (2) notifying the
fact-finder; (3) allowing the defendant to make a narrative statement;
and (4) refraining from taking any action at all. Each option is replete
with practical, procedural, and constitutional consequences and each
court's reaction to the choice of any option varies among juris-
dictions. 13
4
133. Before analyzing his options, an attorney must assure himself that his client's
planned testimony will be perjured. Without this knowledge the dilemma cannot
arise. Although the MODEL CODE does not offer practical solutions to the perjury
problem, its command once a client expresses a perjurious intent is clear: a law-
yer cannot knowingly use perjured testimony. MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 7-
102(A)(4). Thus, once an attorney knows, or from facts within his knowledge,
should know, id. EC 7-26, that a client's testimony is perjured, the MODEL CODE
provisions ostensibly apply. DEFENSE STANDARDS section 7.7 explains that its
provisions can be followed when "the defendant has admitted to his lawyer facts
which establish guilt and the lawyer's independent investigation establishes that
the admissions are true." DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 39, § 7.7(a).
But determining to a court's satisfaction that a client will lie may prove diffi-
cult. Simple conjecture by the attorney that his client will lie will not suffice.
United States ex rel Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977). Discuss-
ing this conjecture with the trial judge without any firm factual basis would vio-
late the duty of defense counsel, and might usurp the judge's and jury's function.
Id; accord State v. Lloyd, 48 Md. App. 535, 542, 429 A.2d 244, 247 (1981). The
difference between knowledge and conjecture, however, is murky. Courts are di-
vided, for instance, on whether a change in a defendant's story suggests perjury.
Compare Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844, 850 (D.C. 1980) (attorney's deter-
mination that the defendant would lie because of inconsistent stories was based on
surmise) and Johnson v. United States, 404 A.2d 162, 164 (D.C. 1979) (same is
true for a judge) with Maddox v. State, 613 S.W.2d 275, 283-84 (Tex. Crim. App.
1981) (defendant's attorneys were justified in moving to withdraw when the de-
fendant changed an alibi defense, relied upon for some time, immediately before
trial).
The confusion among courts makes it even more difficult for an attorney to
make a rational choice in dealing with client perjury. Courts seem to analyze a
defendant's behavior and his attorney's reaction on a case-by-case basis making it
difficult to cull any favored options. Regardless of this division among the courts,
a defense attorney must keep in mind his obligation to defend. United States ex
rel Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977). This obligation remains
despite knowledge of the defendant's guilt. State v. Lloyd, 48 Md. App. 535, 547,
429 A.2d 244, 250 (1981).
134. The reasons for this confusing diversity are numerous. First, the factual situations
under which the dilemma arises are not consistent. There are cases where the
client actually informs the attorney of his plans to commit perjury, see People v.
Salquerro, 107 Misc. 2d 155, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980), cases where
the attorney determines himself that the client will lie, see Thornton v. United
States, 357 A.2d 429 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976), and cases where
the judge determines that a defendant will testify perjuriously. See Johnson v.
United States, 404 A.2d 162 (D.C. 1979).
Second, determining when a client will lie is problematic. See supra note 133.
Finally, use of the standards governing professional behavior is questionable: the
MODEL CODE provides no practical option, see supra notes 30-31 and accompany-
ing text, and the DEFENSE STANDARD section 7.7's status is in limbo. See supra
Client Perjury
A. Motioning to Withdraw
An attorney's initial reaction when faced with possible client per-
jury is often to attempt to withdraw from representation of the defend-
ant. While this option is supported by some authorities, 35 its use can
create practical and constitutional problems depending on when and
before whom the motion is made.
If the motion to withdraw is made and granted before trial begins,
practical problems arise. Once the court appointed or privately re-
tained attorney leaves the defendant may realize his mistake and sim-
ply withhold his plans to commit perjury from the new attorney. 36
Alternatively, delay might result if the defendant is equally frank with
the new attorney who also decides to withdraw. 137 Withdrawal may
even facilitate perjury if the second attorney lacks the scruples of the
first and either aids in the commission of perjury or fails to prevent
it.' 3 8 Since reasons for the request usually must accompany a motion
to withdraw, 39 judicial impartiality may be destroyed if the case is
tried before a judge."4 Also, by giving reasons to a judge for the mo-
tion, the attorney's obligation of confidentiality may be violated.
Depending on the circumstances surrounding the motion, constitu-
tional problems may also arise when a motion to withdraw is made. In
Butler v. United States the defendant's attorneys made a motion to
withdraw to a judge who eventually became the trier of fact. Because
note 47. Even when the DEFENSE STANDARD was in effect, its use was disputed.
Compare Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978) (implicit rejection of
DEFENSE STANDARD when judge is the fact-finder) with Butler v. United States,
414 A.2d 844 (D.C. 1980) (use of section 7.7 approved in certain situations).
Contusion also results from the fact that an attorney's options are interrelated
and are not easily separable. For example, if an attorney moves to withdraw as
defense counsel, and that motion is denied, he can use the alternative suggested by
the DEFENSE STANDARD. But if that motion was made in front of the fact-finder,
the attorney may have already jeopardized his client's chances for a fair trial
through notification.
135. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op.
1314 (1975); DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 39, § 7.7(b).
136. FREEDMAN, supra note 31, at 33; see also People v. Salquerro, 107 Misc. 2d 155,
158, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711, 713 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
137. People v. Salquerro, 107 Misc. 2d 155, 158, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711, 713 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980). That delay might be deliberately invoked by the defendant.
138. Id.
139. FREEDMAN, supra note 31, at 33-34.
140. See, e.g., Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1978). Recusal of the
judge may be an alternative in such a situation. Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d
844, 852 (D.C. 1980). The Butler court determined that recusal was mandated
after an attorney told the hearing and trial judge that the government could prove
its case beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant intended to commit
perjury. Id But recusal has been criticized. See People v. Salquerro, 107 Misc.
2d 155, 160-61, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711,714-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (recusal of sentenc-
ing judge is not necessary when he becomes aware of defendant's intention to
commit perjury because there are many situations when the judge becomes aware
of a defendant's incriminating statements but is not disqualified).
141. 414 A.2d 844 (D.C. 1980).
19831
Baltimore Law Review
the attorneys had previously explained to the judge the specifics of the
client's plan to commit perjury, a violation of the defendant's sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel occurred. 42 How-
ever, in Maddox v. State143 no violation of the defendant's sixth
amendment right was found when the motion was made, without ex-
planation, to a judge in a jury trial.' 4"
Accordingly, an attorney's motion to withdraw can violate the var-
ious duties he owes to the defendant and to the court. By making such
a motion, an attorney jeopardizes attorney-client confidentiality be-
cause the client may withold information from his first lawyer or a re-
placement. The duty to the court may also be jeopardized if the new
attorney aids in the commission of the perjury. Protection of the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial may be lost if the fact-finder's impartiality
is affected by the motion. Finally, the defendant's right to effective
assistance of counsel may be violated by a motion to withdraw.
Because this option may violate the various duties of the attorney,
its use should be limited. This alternative should only be considered if
an attorney can assure himself that the problems discussed will not
arise. In any event, motions to withdraw are likely to be denied as long
as the attorney can provide some measure of effective assistance.' 45
B. Notifying the Fact-Finder
Another initial reaction to client perjury may be to notify the court
of the client's intention, in hopes of shifting the burden of deciding how
to react to the trial judge. Notification to the court of the defendant's
proposed perjury can occur both knowingly and unknowingly. Notifi-
cation can occur unknowingly through a motion to withdraw, depend-
ing on when the motion is made, if the reasons for the motion are not
given) 4 1 Outright notification takes place when the attorney explains
the client's intentions to the judge. Although this alternative has been
suggested by several sources, 147 it presents the same constitutional ob-
142. Id at 850; accord Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 1978) (Huf-
stedler, J., specially concurring).
143. 613 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
144. Id at 284. At the same time a due process analysis has been utilized. When a
motion was made in the middle of the defendant's testimony denying participa-
tion in the crime and in front of the judge trying the case, the defendant was
deprived of his right to a fair trial. Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 731 (9th
Cir. 1978). According to the Ninth Circuit, the attorney's actions "disabled the
fact-finder from judging the merits of the defendant's defense." Id at 730.
145. People v. Salquerro, 107 Misc. 2d 155, 159-60, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711, 714 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1980).
146. See, e.g., Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1978). But see People v.
Salquerro, 107 Misc. 2d 155, 160-61, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711, 714-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980) (no prejudicial notification from motion made to judge who was not fact-
finder).
147. See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d 136 (1970); ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. 1314 (1975).
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stacles as notification through a motion to withdraw. That is, if the
notification is made to the fact-finder, it may impermissibly prejudice
his decision. Yet in United States v. Campbell, 148 when the attorney
announced to the judge, in front of the jury, that the defendant was
testifying against the attorney's will no prejudice was found. 49 While
the announcement was not a literal notification of the defendant's per-
jury, surely a perceptive jury knew what was going on.
Although notification probably does not violate an attorney's duty
to the court, it fails to protect the defendant's rights to effective repre-
sentation, to receive a fair trial, and to testify. Additionally, notifica-
tion may destroy attorney-client confidentiality. Since the standards
and case law which allow notification to the court fail to distinguish
situations in which the option can be safely used and instances where
its use may harm the defendant's right to a fair trial, an attorney should
not choose this option unless he can insure that his client's rights will
be protected.' 50
C. Allowing a Narrative Statement
The alternative suggested by Defense Standard section 7.7'5" may
come closest to accommodating both the search for the truth and the
protection of the defendant's rights.'52 The standard suggests that the
attorney should first advise his client that perjury is illegal; if his client
persists counsel should attempt to withdraw. Should the court deny the
motion or if it is too far into the trial to withdraw, then the attorney
should allow the defendant to make a narrative statement. Counsel
should, however, refrain from interrogating his client or arguing the
testimony to the jury. This approach allows the attorney to refrain
from active participation in the client's testimony, while giving the de-
fendant a chance to take the stand.' 53
While use of the standard has been praised and has been held to
protect attorneys from challenges of ineffective representation, 54 it has
148. 616 F.2d 1151 (9th Cir. 1980).
149. Id at 1152-53. In Campbell, the court found that the "[mjistake was one that a
'reasonably competent attorney' might make in an effort to comply with his ethi-
cal duties." Id at 1152. Additionally, the evidence in the case showed that the
defendant was overwhelmingly guilty. Id at 1152-53. Nonetheless, the attorney's
notice probably prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial.
150. This option may be useless because it simply shifts the burden of decision onto the
judge in a jury trial. If it is a bench trial, the judge's evenhandedness may be
jeopardized. Notification may also be a breach of the attorney-client confidential
relationship. Lefstein, supra note 73, at 684-85.
151. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 33, § 7.7. For the text of both the original and
revised defense standard see supra note 47.
152. Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 437-38 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1024 (1976).
153. 357 A.2d at 437-38.
154. Maddox v. State, 613 S.W.2d 275, 284 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
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also been criticized. 5 5 Its practical shortcomings may arise during
trial. The prosecution may object to use of the standard because it de-
prives the state of the right to object to what may be inadmissible testi-
mony. 56  Also, even if the narrative statement is allowed, the
prosecution might expose the reason for its use by cross-examining the
defendant or explaining to the fact-finder the reasons for the statement.
The explanation that a defendant is making a narrative statement be-
cause his attorney does not want to elicit perjured testimony would
most certainly influence the fact-finder and deprive the defendant of a
fair trial.
Despite these criticisms, and despite the fact that the standard's
status is in limbo, 57 the Defense Standard's approach may be the only
means of accommodating the interests of the defendant, the attorney,
and the court. The defendant's right to testify is protected by use of the
narrative statement. The right to effective representation is not violated
because the attorney can still defend his client without referring to the
narrative testimony. Additionally, the defendant's right to a fair trial
would be protected because, in a jury trial, the fact-finder theoretically
would not be made aware of the defendant's actions. Attorney-client
confidentiality would also be promoted, since by using the defense
standard no breach occurs. Finally, the attorney's duty to the court is
upheld since counsel, through use of the standard, does not actively
participate in the defendant's actions.
The practical problems associated with the use of a narrative state-
ment might be alleviated in a jury trial 5 by a judge who maintains
control over the prosecution's behavior.'59 As a result of the narrative
statement, the defendant has a chance to testify, the attorney does not
aid in the testimony, and the court or the jury remain unbiased.
D. Taking No Action
Professor Monroe Freedman has promoted what is undoubtedly
the most controversial alternative based on his belief that the attorney's
duty to maintain his client's confidences is of the utmost importance.160
This alternative involves treating the lying client like any other witness
including interrogating him on direct examination and arguing his tes-
155. See Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844, 859 (D.C. 1980) (Reilly, C.J., dissent-
ing) (use of the standard comes dangerously close to allowing a defendant to lie).
156. FREEDMAN, supra note 31, at 37.
157. See supra note 47.
158. Whether this alternative would work in a bench trial is questionable, since a judge
is likely to know the circumstances surrounding use of the standard.
159. In one case, the judge protected the defendant from objectionable cross-examina-
tion. Maddox v. State, 613 S.W.2d 275, 277-78 (Tex. Crim App. 1981).
160. See FREEDMAN, supra note 31, at 29; Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the
Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469
(1966). Contra Wolfram, supra note 1, at 868 (author suggests client can waive
attorney-client privilege by written agreement).
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timony in closing to the jury. Implicit in the support for this alternative
is the belief that the fact-finder's job in an adversarial system is to sort
through all the testimony to determine which is true and which is false.
This alternative has received a handful of case support.'6 ' In
People v. B/ye, 162 the defendant had a right to take the stand even
though his appointed defense counsel felt that to do so would be to
allow the defendant to "obviously perjure himself."' 163 The state's evi-
dence showed that the defendant, an escaped mental patient, was found
leaving a trail of blood near the scene of a looting with items from the
crime in his possession."6 His attorney refused to call the defendant to
testify because he intended to deny participation in the incident. 65
Blye was eventually convicted of burglary.
The District Court of Appeals of California reversed on appeal
and awarded a new trial. The court, holding that the defendant had a
right to testify, stated:
if the record shows that a defendant makes a proper and
timely demand to take the stand contrary to the advice given
by his counsel, such a defendant has the right to give an expo-
sition of his defense before a jury. This insistence may be fa-
tal to his chances of acquittal, but to prevent him from doing
so, if the record shows -his firm desire to testify, would be to
deny him a right that every defendant should have in a crimi-
nal case. 166
Ignoring the problems inherent in withdrawing, 167 the court sug-
gested that if the attorney could not support his client's testimony he
should have withdrawn. 68 While this decision recognizes the impor-
tance of a client's right to testify, its precedential value is limited be-
cause the court failed to analyze the entire client perjury problem.
The B/ye decision implicitly supports Professor Freedman's alter-
native without recognizing its potential problems. Supporters of Freed-
man's alternative are aware of these problems and suggest that before
resorting to this action an attorney should inform the defendant that
committing perjury is illegal, attempt to persuade the defendant against
such behavior, and advise him that a sentencing judge might consider
the perjury in the final determination of a sentence. 69 Critics have
161. See People v. Blye, 233 Cal. App. 2d 143, 43 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1965); Allen v. State,
518 S.W.2d 170 (Mo. 1979).
162. 233 Cal. App. 2d 143, 43 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1965).
163. Id at 148, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
164. Id at 144-45, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 232-33. The evidence showed that the defendant
had kicked in a store window and cut his foot.
165. Id at 148, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
166. Id at 149, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
167. See supra notes 135-45 and accompanying text.
168. People v. Blye, 233 Cal. App. 2d 143, 149, 43 Cal. Rptr. 231, 235-36 (1965).
169. FREEDMAN, supra note 31, at 31-32; see also Wolfram, supra note 1, at 842.
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pointed out that this option distorts the truth, 7 ° and have mistakenly
referred to it as subornation of perjury. 7 '
Ironically, this alternative may be the most frequently used among
practicing attorneys.'72 For it to be accepted among the members of
the American Bar Association and its established policing bodies, how-
ever, would require a broad reevaluation of the traditional duties of the
lawyer and goals of the judicial system. While protecting the defend-
ant's rights, this option sacrifices the attorney's duty to the court. By
using this option, counsel effectively aids in the presentation of per-
jured testimony.
V. CONCLUSION
The attorney faced with a client who proposes to falsely testify is
confronted by an almost insurmountable dilemma. It arises from the
attorney's conflicting duties to the client and the court. The dilemma
cannot be reconciled by viewing client perjury in the vacuum of profes-
sional ethics. To reach a reasonable solution, the constitutional rights
of the defendant and the practical constraints mandated by trial prac-
tice must be taken into account. Additionally, the lawyer's common
law duties to the defendant and the judicial system must be analyzed.
Both the Model Code and the new Model Rules fail to consider all
of the attorney's competing obligations in their respective solutions to
the problem. The Model Code provides the attorney with rules of con-
duct, but fails to suggest practical alternatives. The Model Rules de-
mand disclosure to the court, but fail to consider the constitutional
ramifications of such an alternative.
The solution that comes closest to reconciling the attorney's duties
and the practical consequences of various alternatives is the American
Bar Association's Defense Standard section 7.7. Because this standard
was withdrawn pending approval of the new Model Rules, its use may
be questionable. Nonetheless, by allowing the defendant to make a
narrative statement, the standard protects the defendant's right to tes-
tify while preventing the attorney from actually presenting and arguing
perjured testimony. Lawyers concerned with establishing a practical
170. See, e.g., Wolfram, Client Perjury. The Kutak Commission and the Association of
Trial Lawyers, Lying Clients, and the Adversary System, 1980 A.B. FOUND. RE-
SEARCH J. 964, 973. But see In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1945) (function
of trial is to sort through all the testimony to determine which is true and which is
false. For perjury to result in a finding of contempt, it must be an obstruction of
the court or jury in performing the task of finding the truth).
171. See FREEDMAN, supra note 31, at 31.
172. Id. at 38. In an informal survey of Washington, D.C. attorneys conducted by
Professor Freedman concerning their reaction to intended client perjury 95% said
they would call the defendant to testify, and of that group 90% said they would
question the defendant normally. Id
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solution in such a situation should reevaluate this alternative in light of
the failure of others to solve the dilemma of proposed client perjury.
Ronald Evan Aper
